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Fairness concerns guide children’s judgments about how to share resources with others.
However, it is unclear from past research if children take extant inequalities or the
value of resources involved in an inequality into account when sharing with others;
these questions are the focus of the current studies. In all experiments, children saw
an inequality between two recipients—one had two more resources than another.
What varied between conditions was the value of the resources that the child could
subsequently distribute. When the resources were equal in value to those involved in
the original inequality, children corrected the previous inequality by giving two resources
to the child with fewer resources (Experiment 1). However, as the value of the resources
increased relative to those initially shared by the experimenter, children were more likely
to distribute the two high value resources equally between the two recipients, presumably
to minimize the overall inequality in value (Experiments 1 and 2). We found that children
specifically use value, not just size, when trying to equalize outcomes (Experiment 3)
and further found that children focus on the relative rather than absolute value of the
resources they share—when the experimenter had unequally distributed the same high
value resource that the child would later share, children corrected the previous inequality
by giving two high value resources to the person who had received fewer high value
resources. These results illustrate that children attempt to correct past inequalities and
try to maintain equality not just in the count of resources but also by using the value of
resources.
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Fairness is certainly important to human society (Boyd and
Richerson, 2005), but deciding how best to be fair is no easy
task. Adults and children must balance many different obliga-
tions and norms when deciding what is fair: they need to consider
past inequalities, reciprocity, the value of resources, social rela-
tionships, and the amount of work that others have done when
deciding how to fairly distribute resources (Fiske, 1992; Mills and
Clark, 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Olson and Spelke, 2008;
Moore, 2009; Shaw and Knobe, 2013). Indeed, sometimes doing
the fair thing requires, counter intuitively, distributing resources
unequally. For example, imagine two employees both did a good
job on a project and their boss rewarded them with baseball tick-
ets, but one employee was given three tickets while the other was
given only one. It would be fair for the boss to give two addi-
tional baseball tickets to the employee who had received fewer
tickets, at a later date, but it would not be fair for the boss to give
the employee two new company cars to address the ticket-based
inequality. Giving unequally is fair in the former case because
it corrects the past unequal distribution, but not in the latter
case because this would over-correct the past inequality, actually
increasing the overall inequality. The reason for this difference is
that a car is substantially more valuable than a ticket to a baseball
game. Adults recognize that all inequalities are not equal; they
will share unequally themselves in order to correct or minimize
inequality between others (Dawes et al., 2007; Xiao and Bicchieri,
2010), and do so by taking resource value into account (Cook and
Hegtvedt, 1983; Brown, 1984; Gurven, 2006).
One goal of the current research is to examine whether chil-
dren focus on the norm of sharing equally themselves, or on
trying to make the overall distribution of resources equal by cor-
recting existent inequalities. If they do correct previous inequal-
ities in order to equate outcomes, a second goal of the current
research is to investigate whether children take resource value into
account when trying to minimize inequality between others. Do
they correct inequalities by trying to make the count of resources
equal—giving cars to make up for unfair ticket-giving—or do
they attempt to make the overall value of the resources as equal
as possible?
We know that children are biased toward equal distribution
of resources, but there has been very little research on how chil-
dren respond to existent inequalities. Research with infants using
looking time measures suggests that by the second year of life
infants expect resources to be distributed equally between two
agents, as long as both agents are highlighted as possible recipi-
ents (Geraci and Surian, 2011; Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011;
Sloane et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2012). By 3 to 4 years of
age, children themselves share resources equally with third par-
ties when they can (Olson and Spelke, 2008), and are reluctant
to share unequally when an equal option is possible, even when
they know that one recipient was mean in a previous interaction
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(Kenward and Dahl, 2011), or did more work than the other
recipient (Baumard et al., 2012). Indeed, if an equal option is pos-
sible, children default to giving equally rather than based onmerit
until they are 6 years old (e.g., Lerner, 1974; Hook and Cook,
1979; Sigelman and Waitzman, 1991). We also know that by age
six children dislike those who share unequally (Shaw et al., 2012).
While we know that by age six children will distribute resources
unequally themselves based on merit and dislike those who share
unequally, we do not know if children will distribute resources
unequally themselves to correct previous inequalities in service of
making overall outcomes equal [the one exception is Libby and
Garrett (1974), but this experiment conflates correcting previ-
ous inequalities with reciprocity]. Because in the real world not
everyone will always share equally, it is important to know how
children respond to existent inequalities. Do they simply main-
tain these inequalities by trying to share equally themselves, or do
they attempt to correct these inequalities by sharing unequally?
This is one question the current research will address.
We also know very little about how children divide resources
that differ in value, despite the fact that many forms of exchange
involve resources that are not equal in value. Most research on
children’s and even adults’ equality concerns has focused on
decisions that involve distributing a single type of resource, for
example, distributing a sum of money or a sum of cookies rather
than having a person divide some money and some cookies (for
reviews, see Damon, 1977; Walster et al., 1978; Hook and Cook,
1979). Using a single resource is useful because it minimizes ran-
dom variation in preference for different resources. However,
using a single resource fails to capture an important aspect of
real world exchanges, and certainly does not capture exchanges
in pre-agrarian human societies since fungible currency is a rela-
tively recent human invention (Burgoyne and Lea, 2006). Indeed,
there are very few fungible resources—one cannot substitute a
unit of iPod for a unit of yoyo. Equally sharing non-fungible
resources requires some recognition of value: how many units of
resource A could be exchanged for how many units of resource B
(Fiske, 1992). Being able to equate the value of varied resources
is not only important in modern societies, but is also impor-
tant for bartering and food sharing in smaller hunter-gatherer
societies—even within the same animal carcass, different regions
of the animal vary in value (Hill and Kaplan, 1993; Gurven, 2004).
Since real world exchanges require some understanding of value,
it is important to understand how value influences children’s
intuitions about how to share with others.
What little work that has been done on children’s under-
standing of value has examined how children’s preference for a
resource influences their willingness to give resources to another
person. We know that children, like adults, demonstrate prefer-
ences for some goods over others (Harbaugh et al., 2001), and
use their preferences when deciding how many resources to give
away (Birch and Billman, 1986). Blake and Rand (2010) had 3-
to 6-year-old children identify their least favorite sticker (Low
Value) and their most favorite sticker (High Value). They found
that children shared more of their least favorite sticker than their
most favorite sticker [for a similar effect in adults, see Novakova
and Flegr (2013)]. This result importantly demonstrates that chil-
dren weigh the value of being generous or fair against the personal
value they place on a resource. However, this result does not tell
us if children take value into account when deciding how to min-
imize inequality between others. Doing so requires children to
use their preferences or some other information to make guesses
about what others would want, and try to minimize inequality
between others based on this dimension. This assumes that chil-
dren have a belief about the value of resources that goes beyond
their own idiosyncratic preferences. If children really understand
value, they should distribute resources to two third parties in a
way that minimizes the discrepancy in the value of the resources
that the two third parties have. In terms of the example above, if
children believe that it is inappropriate to give someone two com-
pany cars to correct a past inequality of two baseball tickets, this
would suggest that they understand value and use it to guide their
judgments.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we first investigated whether children correct
existent inequalities in order to minimize inequality in outcomes.
Children were asked to share two resources with two non-present
recipients who had already received resources from the exper-
imenter. The experimenter gave three resources to one of the
recipients and one to the other recipient. If children try to make
outcomes equal, then they should give both erasers to the recip-
ient with fewer resources (giving unequally but correcting the
inequality) rather than giving one to each recipient (maintaining
the inequality by giving equally themselves). We investigated this
question in 6- to 8-year-old children because past research has
demonstrated that it is at this age that children become comfort-
able sharing unequally with third parties, at least based on merit
(e.g., Hook and Cook, 1979; Shaw and Olson, 2012).
If children do give more resources to those who currently have
fewer resources, it would be unclear if they do so in order to
keep the count of the resources equal, or in order to keep the
value of the resources equal. To investigate if children use value
to determine how to equalize outcomes, we included two condi-
tions in which children were sharing resources that were slightly
more valuable (jar of Play-Doh, Medium Value Condition) or
much more valuable ($20 bill, High Value Condition) than the
resources that were initially shared unequally by the experimenter.
If children want to keep the count of resources equal, then chil-
dren should respond similarly in all conditions, by giving two
resources to the recipient with fewer resources and thus equaliz-
ing the count of resources. If instead children care about keeping
the value of resources as equal as possible, then, as the value of the
resources to be shared increases, children should become increas-
ingly likely to share equally themselves by giving one resource to
each recipient. We investigated these questions in this study.
METHODS
Participants
Participants included 84 children aged 6 to 8 years old. Of these
participants, 28 were in the Equal Value Condition (M = 7 years,
6 months, SD = 12 months; 15 females), 28 were in the Medium
Value Condition (M = 7 years, 4 months, SD = 11 months; 8
females), and 28 were in the High Value Condition (M = 7 years,
0 month, SD = 12 months; 15 females).
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Procedure
Two buckets were placed in front of the participant and the exper-
imenter said (modeled on Shaw and Olson’s (2012) method):
Thanks for playing this game with me. Earlier today, two kids
named Mark and Dan did a great job cleaning up their room and
we want to give them erasers as a prize. The problem is I don’t
know how much to give them; can you help me with that?
We are going to decide how many erasers Mark and Dan will get.
Mark’s erasers go in this bucket andDan’s erasers go in this bucket.
We have six erasers. I am going to give these four erasers and you
are going to give these two erasers. I’ll go first. We have one for
Mark, one for Dan. One for Mark, and one more for Mark. Now
it’s your turn; here are two erasers. Give them however you want.
Each time Mark or Dan’s name was used, the experimenter
pointed to the corresponding bucket. During the allocation phase
of the task, the experimenter placed an eraser into the corre-
sponding bucket when noting who was receiving the eraser (Mark
or Dan). The erasers were colorful and shaped like fun things
children like, such as turtles, sports balls, and ice cream cones,
and have been used in previous research on decision-making in
children (Shaw and Olson, 2012; Shaw et al., in press). After the
allocation phase, children were handed two erasers that they could
place in the two buckets however they wanted. Children were
always given two resources to distribute, and distributed until
there were no resources remaining. On half of the trials Mark’s
bucket was on the left, and on half of the trials Mark’s bucket was
on the right.
In order to investigate the influence of value on children’s
decisions, we had two additional conditions in which children
distributed resources that were slightly more valuable (Medium
Value Condition) or muchmore valuable (High Value Condition)
than the resources (erasers) that were shared unequally by the
experimenter; all other aspects of the design of these conditions
was identical to the condition described above. The slightly more
valuable object in the Medium Value Condition was a 3 oz jar
of Play-Doh, and the much more valuable resource in the High
Value Condition was a $20 bill. Children could not make the value
of resources equal in these conditions, since both Play-Doh and a
$20 bill are presumably worth much more than two erasers (for
empirical verification that children see these items as more valu-
able than erasers, see Experiment 4), but they could ensure that
the inequality did not increase. Specifically, they could give one
high value resource to each recipient rather than giving two to the
person with fewer low value resources, if they were interested in
maintaining the smallest overall inequality.
RESULTS
Because no children chose the option of giving two erasers to
the person with more erasers, we conducted analyses with just
the two strategies that children used—sharing equally by giving
one to each recipient, or giving two to the person with fewer
resources. We first conducted a 3 × 2 Yates-corrected χ2 test
on children’s responses in the Equal, Medium, and High Value
Conditions, which revealed a main effect of condition, χ2(2,
N = 84) = 23.37, p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | Percentage of children giving two resources to the recipient
with fewer resources in the Equal, Medium and High Value Conditions
from Experiment 1.
We then examined whether children’s responses differed
between pairs of conditions by conducting Yates-corrected χ2
tests. A 2 × 2 Yates-corrected χ2 test revealed that children in
the Equal Value Condition were more likely to give two erasers
to the disadvantaged recipient than children in the High Value
Condition, χ2(1,N = 56) = 23.17, p < 0.001, and children in
the Medium Value Condition, χ2(1,N = 56) = 4.29, p = 0.038
(see Figure 1). As the resources became more valuable than those
involved in the original inequality, children were more likely to
give one to each recipient than to give two to the recipient who
had fewer resources. Next, we examined if children’s responses
differed in the Medium and High Value Conditions using a Yates-
corrected χ2 test, which revealed that children in High Value
Condition were more likely to give one resource to each child than
children in the Medium Value condition, χ2(1,N = 56) = 7.62,
p = 0.006. Again, as the value of the resources increased, chil-
dren shifted their preference from giving two to the recipient with
fewer resources to giving one resource to each recipient.
We next conducted binomial tests to compare children’s
responses to chance responding. The binomial test on the Equal
Value Condition revealed that children gave two to the recipient
with fewer erasers (24 out of 28) more often than giving one to
each recipient (4 out of 28), p < 0.001. This result indicates that
children preferred to make the total amount of resources equal
between recipients, rather than to give equally themselves, when
all resources were of equal value. A binomial test on children’s
choices in the Medium Value condition revealed that children did
not show a preference for how to distribute the medium value
resources, with about half the children giving two to the recip-
ient with fewer resources (16 out of 28), and about half of the
children giving one to each recipient (12 out of 28), p = 0.572.
However, the binomial test on the High Value Condition revealed
that children gave one to each recipient (23 out of 28) more often
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than giving two to the recipient with fewer erasers (5 out of 28),
p = 0.001.
DISCUSSION
Children corrected inequalities created by an experimenter, and
did so by attempting to equate the value, not just the count, of
the resources distributed. When children distributed resources
that were equal in value to those shared unequally by the exper-
imenter, children gave more resources to a recipient who had
received fewer resources in order to correct the existent inequality.
Children could have ignored the inequality that was created by the
experimenter and simply focused on the norm of giving equally
themselves, since we know from past research that children have
a tendency to share equally with others (Damon, 1977). However,
this result indicates that children can inhibit their tendency to
give equally to others when they are confronted with someone
who had received fewer resources previously. Rather than sim-
ply defaulting to giving one resource to each recipient, children
wanted to ensure that both recipients received an equal number
of resources, at least when those resources were of equal value.
We next asked whether, when children try to make out-
comes equal, they try to simply make the count of resources
equal, or whether they consider the value of the resources. Our
results suggest that children do use value when deciding how to
share. Children behaved differently when sharing resources that
were much more valuable (e.g., $20 bills) than the unequally
shared erasers, giving the resources equally themselves rather
than attempting to correct the past inequality. Perhaps children
distributed the more valuable resources differently because they
realized that giving the disadvantaged child two $20 bills would
actually make the outcome even more unequal, though now in
the other recipient’s favor.
Although we interpret these results as indicating that chil-
dren minimize inequality between others by using value, this
is not the only possible interpretation. One alternative possi-
bility is that children were confused in the Medium and High
Value Conditions because they were required to match distribu-
tions involvingmultiple resources. However, the fact that children
differentiated between the Medium and High Value Conditions
speaks against this alternative—the resources used in both the
Medium and High Value Conditions were different from the
resources that were distributed by the experimenter, yet chil-
dren treated these two conditions differently, suggesting they used
some sense of value to guide their decisions. However, this by
itself does not provide enough evidence to rule out the possi-
bility that children were confused in these conditions. Perhaps
children were indeed confused in the Medium Value Condition,
and only behaved differently in the High Value Condition because
there is something special about money that makes children more
likely to share equally or pay attention to the value of resources.
Previous research with adults indicates that when people dis-
tribute money, as compared to other resources, they are likely to
think in terms of market exchanges (DeVoe and Iyengar, 2010)
and this may cause them to think about resources in terms of their
value (Fiske, 1992). In Experiment 2, we controlled for this pos-
sibility by having children divide high value resources that were
not money. We also attempted to further rule out the possibility
that children responded differently in the higher value conditions
because they were confused by having to distribute resources that
were different from those shared by the experimenter. To do this,
in Experiment 2, both conditions had children dividing resources
that were different from the resources shared by the experimenter.
However, in one condition children were sharing a higher value
resource and in the other condition they were sharing a lower
value resource. If children were merely confused in Experiment
1 by having to divide resources that were different than those
shared by the experimenter, then they should respond similarly
in both conditions of Experiment 2 because children are dividing
different resources in both conditions. If instead, as we predict,
children were using value to guide their decision of how to equate
outcomes, then they should be less inclined to give one to each
recipient when they are dividing a resource of lower value as
compared to one of higher value.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHODS
Participants
Participants included 56 children aged 6 to 8 years old. Of these
participants, 28 were in the Lower Value Condition (M = 7 years,
5 months, SD = 10 months; 13 females) and 28 were in the
Higher Value Condition (M = 7 years, 1 month, SD = 8 months;
19 females).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was very similar to that used in
Experiment 1. Again the experimenter gave out four resources
unequally, giving three to one recipient and one to the other,
using the script described in Experiment 1. Then, the participant
was told to share two resources with the two recipients. We did,
however, make two changes. First, we used different resources in
Experiment 2. In the Higher Value Condition, the experimenter
gave out four lower value resources (four small fruit-flavored can-
dies) and the participant gave out two higher value rewards (two
full-sized chocolate candy bars). This method was similar to the
Medium and High Value Conditions from Experiment 1, so we
predicted a similar pattern of results—that participants would
be less willing to give more resources to the person who had
fewer resources. In the Lower Value Condition, the experimenter
gave out high value resources (four full-sized chocolate candy
bars), and the participant gave out two lower value rewards (two
small fruit-flavored candies). If children’s responses in the pre-
vious experiment were merely being driven by confusion about
how to distribute a resource different than the one involved in
the original inequality, or by money priming them to think about
value, then they should respond at chance or give one lower value
resource to each recipient as they did in the Medium and High
Value Conditions from Experiment 1. However, if children try to
equate value to minimize inequality of outcomes between others,
then they should instead give two low value resources to the recip-
ient who received fewer higher value resources. Giving more low
value resources to the recipient with fewer resources would not
make the distribution equal, but is the most equal option available
to children. We deliberately used different types of candy because
we wanted to ensure that children were responding to value, not
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merely thinking about the resources in terms of large and small
quantities of the same resource (for empirical verification that
children see the chocolate bars as more valuable than the small
fruit candies, see Experiment 4).
A second change from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 was that
we now presented the resources on pieces of paper (5 × 8′′) rather
than placing them in buckets. We modified this aspect of the
design to reduce the memory load required to complete this task.
RESULTS
Again, because very few children chose the option of giving two
resources to the person with more resources (only one child
who was in the Higher Value Condition and no children in
the Lower Value Condition), we again conducted our analyses
focusing on the strategies that children used—sharing equally
themselves by giving one to each recipient, or giving two to the
person with fewer resources1. A 2 × 2 Yates-corrected χ2 test
revealed that children in the Higher Value Condition were more
likely to give one resource to each child than children in the
Lower Value Condition, χ2(1,N = 55) = 6.28, p = 0.013, see
Figure 2. When the resources children shared were more valuable
than the resources shared unequally by the experimenter, children
shifted their preference from giving two to the person with fewer
resources to giving one resource to each recipient.
We next conducted binomial tests to compare children’s
responses to chance responding. A binomial test on children’s
choices in the Higher Value Condition revealed that children did
not show a preference, with about half the children giving two
1We analyze the results here without including the one child who gave the
non-standard response of giving more to the person with more resources, but
the pattern of results remain the same if we conservatively run the analyses
counting this child as having given more to the person with fewer resources.
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of children giving two resources to the recipient
with fewer resources in the Lower and Higher Value Conditions from
Experiments 2 and 3.
to the person with fewer resources (15 out of 27) and about half
of the children giving one to each recipient (12 out of 27), p =
0.701. However, the binomial test on the Lower Value Condition
revealed that children chose to give two resources to the recipient
with fewer resources (25 out of 28) more often than giving one to
each recipient (3 out of 28), p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
We again found that children correct previous inequalities in
order to minimize inequalities in outcomes between recipients,
and do so by using the value of the resources at their disposal.
When children were presented with an inequality involving high
value resources, but only had a few low value resources with which
to address it, children gave two to the person with fewer resources
since this was the best way to minimize inequality. However, when
children were presented with an inequality involving low value
resources, but only had a few high value resources with which to
address it, children were much less likely to give two to the person
with fewer resources. Importantly, in both conditions children
were dividing resources that were different from the resources
that were distributed by the experimenter, so the results cannot
be explained by confusion involving the distribution of differ-
ent resources (which was common to both conditions). In fact,
the same resources were used in both conditions; what differed
between conditions was which resource was distributed by the
experimenter and which was distributed by the participant. These
results suggest that children focus on trying to equalize outcomes,
and that they do so by using the value of resources.
Although the results thus far are consistent with children using
value to determine how to minimize inequality in outcomes, chil-
dren could be using an even simpler heuristic—size of resource.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the high value resource was physically
larger than the low value resource, and so children may have
been using resource size, not value, to guide their decisions.
In Experiment 3, we dealt with this confound by matching the
volume and surface area of the high and low value resources.
EXPERIMENT 3
METHODS
Participants
Participants included 56 children aged 6 to 8 years old. Of these
participants, 28 were in the Lower Value Condition (M = 7 years,
5.5 months, SD = 12 months; 13 females) and 28 were in the
Higher Value Condition (M = 7 years, 3.5 months, SD = 11
months; 12 females).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2,
except that we used different resources: chocolate bars, and pieces
of cardboard cut to the same size as the chocolate bars. In the
Lower Value Condition, the experimenter gave out high value
resources (four chocolate bars; three to one recipient and one to
the other) and the participant gave out two lower value rewards
(two pieces of cardboard). In the Higher Value Condition, the
experimenter gave out lower value resources (four pieces of card-
board; three to one recipient and one to the other) and the
participant gave out two higher value rewards (two chocolate
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bars). If children in the previous experiments were trying to
equate the volume or surface area of the resources, then chil-
dren should behave similarly in the Higher and Lower Value
Conditions here. However, if children in the previous experiments
were trying to minimize inequality in outcomes by using value,
then they should be more likely to share equally themselves by
giving one resource to each recipient when distributing the higher
value reward as opposed to the lower value reward (for empirical
verification that children see the chocolate bars as more valuable
than cardboard, see Experiment 4).
RESULTS
Again, because no children chose the option of giving more
resources to the recipient with more resources, we conducted
our analyses on children’s two strategies of giving more to
the person with fewer resources and giving one to each
recipient. A Yates-corrected χ2 test revealed that children in
the Higher Value Condition were more likely to give one
resource to each recipient than children in the Lower Value
Condition,χ2(1,N = 56) = 6.3, p = 0.012. As the value of the
resource increased, children shifted their preference from giving
two to the recipient with fewer resources to giving one resource to
each recipient (see Figure 2).
We next conducted binomial tests to compare children’s
responses to chance responding. A binomial test on children’s
choices in the Higher Value Condition revealed that children
did not show a preference, with about half the children giving
two to the recipient with fewer resources (13 out of 28) and
about half of the children giving one to each recipient (15 out
of 27), p = 0.850. However, a binomial test on the Lower Value
Condition revealed that children chose to give two to the recip-
ient with fewer resources (23 out of 28) more often than giving
one to each recipient (5 out of 28), p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
These results again indicate that children are motivated to cre-
ate equal outcomes, not just to give equally themselves, and that
they use value, not just the volume or surface area of resources, to
decide how to create equal outcomes for others. When a resource
was of lower value than the resources involved in the original
inequality, children gave more to the recipient who received fewer
resources originally in order to correct the previous inequality.
However, children were much less likely to give more to the recip-
ient with fewer resources if the resources they were distributing
were more valuable than those involved in original inequality,
presumably because they understand that this would make things
more unequal.
However, one limitation of Experiments 1 through 3 is that we
did not have an empirical measurement of value. We deliberately
chose resources that seemed more valuable to adults; however, we
do not know if children actually think these resources are more
valuable. In Experiment 4 we ask children explicitly about which
items they think that another child would prefer and how many
of the less preferred items they think one would need to trade in
order to get the more preferred item.
One other open question from the previous experiments is
whether children distributed high value resources differently then
low value resources because they treat high value resources dif-
ferently in general or because they noticed that the high value
resources were more valuable than the originally distributed
resources. Perhaps children just maintain the status quo by shar-
ing equally when they are given certain resources to share, regard-
less of the value of resources shared by the experimenter. To
examine this possibility in Experiment 4 we had children dis-
tribute the high value resource from Experiment 3 (a chocolate
bar) in a situation in which equal sharing was not the option
that minimized inequality—where an experimenter shared three
chocolate bars with one recipient and one chocolate bar with
the other. If children treat certain resources differently regard-
less of context, then they should give one chocolate bar to each
recipient as they did in Experiment 2 and 3 when sharing choco-
late bars. However, if what matters is the relationship between
the value of resources already distributed and the resource chil-
dren are sharing, then they should now give two chocolate bars
to the person with fewer resources because this would minimize
inequality between the two recipients.
EXPERIMENT 4
METHODS
Participants
Participants included 28 children aged 6 to 8 years old (M = 7
years, 4 months, SD = 11 months; 13 females).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 4 was the same as Experiment
1 Equal Value Condition, except that the equal value resource
was now the chocolate bars from Experiments 2 to 3 rather than
erasers. That is, the experimenter gave out four chocolate bars,
three to one recipient and one to the other, and the participant
gave out two of the same kind of chocolate bar. In the previous
experiments chocolate bars were treated as a high value resource
in comparison to small fruit candies and cardboard. Therefore,
if children are simply more inclined to maintain the status quo
when distributing objectively valuable resources like chocolate
bars, then we should see children giving one chocolate bar to
each recipient as they had in Experiments 2 and 3. However, if
what children are attempting to do is to equate value, then we
should see them giving two candy bars to the recipient with fewer
candy bars.
After completing the Equal Value Condition, children com-
pleted an explicit measure of value. We asked children to decide
which resource they thought Mark would prefer, resource X or
resource Y—which corresponded to the pairs of resources used
in Experiments 1 through 3. Children were asked about the four
resource pairs in the following order: eraser vs. Play-Doh, eraser
vs. $20 bill, chocolate bar vs. small fruit candy, chocolate bar vs.
piece of cardboard (or the reverse order, counterbalanced between
participants). The items were placed in front of children and chil-
dren were asked, “Which do you think Mark would rather have?”
Children indicated their choice by pointing at one of the two
resources. After answering which one Mark would prefer, chil-
dren were asked how many of the resource they did not choose
(the one they thought Mark would not prefer) Mark would need
to trade in order to get one of the chosen resource. The trading
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measure was designed to produce a rough estimate of how much
more valuable children thought one resource was.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Again, because no children chose the option of giving more
resources to the recipient with more resources, we conducted
our analyses on children’s two strategies of giving more to the
recipient with fewer resources and giving one to each recipi-
ent. We conducted binomial tests to compare children’s responses
to chance responding. A binomial test on children’s choices in
the equal value condition revealed that that children chose to
give two to the recipient with fewer resources (24 out of 28)
more often than giving one to each recipient (4 out of 28), p <
0.001. This result indicates that children do not simply main-
tain the status quo when distributing chocolate bars, a high
value resource from Experiment 2 and 3. Children are perfectly
willing to share unequally by giving more to the person with
fewer resources, disrupting the status quo, when the chocolate
bars are the same value as the resource shared unequally by the
experimenter.
We next conducted binomial tests on children’s responses to
which resource Mark would prefer. Children thought that Mark
would prefer: a jar of Play-Doh to an eraser (26 out of 28), p <
0.001, a $20 bill to an eraser (28 out of 28), p < 0.001; a choco-
late bar to a piece of cardboard (27 out of 28), p < 0.001; and
a chocolate bar to a small fruit candy (24 out of 28), p < 0.001.
These results indicate that our intuitions about children’s valua-
tion of these objects was correct—children thought that the items
we labeled as higher value resources in Experiments 1 through
3 were in fact more preferred than the items we labeled as lower
value resources. We next examined howmany low value resources
children thought one would need to trade to get one of the high
value resources. We found that children thought that one would
need to trade, on average, 8.5 erasers to get one jar of Play-Doh,
17 erasers to get one $20 bill, 10 small fruit candies to get one
chocolate bar, and 26.5 pieces of cardboard to get one choco-
late bar. It is worth noting that in order to reduce skew on the
cardboard/chocolate item we had to code five of the children’s
responses as “100” because they either gave very large numbers
(two children said one thousand and one child said one billion)
or they stated that no amount of the cardboard could be traded
for a chocolate bar (N = 2).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These experiments demonstrated that 6- to 8-year-olds are more
concerned with making the outcome of a resource distribution
equal than with giving equally themselves. They also demon-
strated that children consider value when responding to inequal-
ities. Experiment 1 showed that children will give unequally
themselves in order to minimize inequality of outcome. Children
gave two resources to the recipient with fewer resources so that
both recipients would have three resources, rather than giving
equally themselves and maintaining the inequality. This result
is consistent with past research demonstrating that children will
give unequally in some circumstances, such as when others have
done more work (Damon, 1977; Sigelman and Waitzman, 1991);
however, these results are the first direct demonstration that
children will correct unequal distributions by sharing unequally
with others.
Experiments 1 and 2 also investigated what measure children
use to determine how best to minimize inequality. These exper-
iments illustrated that children use the value of resources, not
just the count, to minimize inequality between others. They did
not opt to give one person two high value resources (equalizing
the count of resources) to correct past unequal sharing of a low
value resource, and instead were more likely to give one high value
resource to each recipient. Experiment 3 further confirmed that
children were using value, not resource size, as a guide for how to
share resources with others. In Experiment 4 children were asked
to make explicit judgments about which resources they thought
another child would prefer. These explicit judgments provided an
empirical confirmation that our high value resources were actu-
ally valued more highly than resources that we labeled as lower
value resources.
It is worth noting that while children became less likely to give
both resources to the recipient with fewer resources as the value
of the new resources increased, in Experiments 2 and 3 about half
the participants still attempted to equate resource count rather
than resource value when sharing the high value resource (large
chocolate bar). It is unclear why children gave mixed responses
in this case, though there are several possibilities. One possibil-
ity is that some children placed different value on the items they
were asked to share. If children thought the chocolate bars were
about as valuable as the fruit candies or cardboard, then it would
be unsurprising that they attempted to equate count rather than
value. However, a more likely possibility is that children did not
know which norm to apply to this situation and so were forced
to choose between two conflicting norms: should I equalize the
count or value of the resources? This conflict in norms may have
made children confused about what to do and led to their chance
responding when distributing the higher value rewards. However,
what is important about these results is that children did differ-
entiate between distributing resources that had higher and lower
value than the original inequality, suggesting that at least some
children take resource value into account when deciding how to
minimize inequality in outcomes between others.
The current findings are interesting to consider in light of
recent work demonstrating that children are fair partly in order to
signal to others that they are fair. Shaw et al. (in press) found that
6- to 8-year-old children were very fair when the other option was
to appear unfair to an experimenter (see also Blake andMcAuliffe,
2011), but were considerably less fair when they did not risk
appearing unfair. The paradigm developed here could be used
to investigate if children will use ambiguous norms, like those
investigated in the current studies, to their advantage in order to
appear fair while getting more for themselves. For example, imag-
ine we repeated the High Value Condition from Experiment 1,
but the participant was the recipient who received more erasers
(low value rewards). We could then ask the participant to dis-
tribute two $20 bills (high value rewards) between him- or herself
and another recipient. Here, it seems likely that children would
do the fair thing and give one $20 bill to themselves and one to
the other recipient because they would have no way to justify
giving two $20 bills to themselves. Next, imagine we repeated
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the High Value Condition from Experiment 1, but that this time
the participant received fewer erasers than the other recipient
and was again asked to distribute two $20 bills. In this case,
children might be more likely to take the two $20 bills for them-
selves since they would have the plausible justification that they
were simply trying to equate the count of resources. These results
would demonstrate that children can use different norms and
plausible deniability to justify their own selfishness, just as adults
do (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Future
research should investigate this possibility.
The results of our experiments demonstrate that the value of
resources influences children’s sharing behavior, but they do not
address how children determine the value of resources in the first
place. The first strategy that children likely use to determine value
is to simply use their own preferences as a guide for how to share
with others. That is, they know what they like, and think that
the things they like are valuable and that the things they dislike
are not valuable. This strategy is likely a large part of children’s
early understanding of value, but as they get older they may use
more sophisticated variables to determine how resources are val-
ued. One possibility is that children use some aggregate sense of
others’ preference for a resource, analogous to the adult concept
of demand—recognizing that the more others want a resource,
the more valuable it is (Baumol, 1972). A second possibility is
that children use resource scarcity to determine value, recogniz-
ing, as adults do, that rare things are more valuable than things
that are commonly available (Lynn, 1991). Yet another possibility
is that children use effort expended to obtain a resource to deter-
mine resource value; all else being equal, they may assume that if a
person worked harder to make or obtain a resource, that resource
is more valuable. It is likely that children, like adults (Baumol,
1972), use some combination of these factors to determine a
resource’s value, and as they get older they incorporate more of
these sophisticated principles to determine resource value.
Now that we know that children can use value to guide their
equality judgments, we can investigate whether or not children
use value in other domains such as trade. Trade is ubiquitous
in modern society and simpler forms of bartering were also
very prevalent before the advent of currency (Fagan, 1969; Hill
and Kaplan, 1993). Being able to equate resources that differ
in value is essential for participating in trade, both modern
forms of trade between nations and simpler forms of barter-
ing (Krugman, 1979; Hill and Kaplan, 1993). Without some
sense of value it would be impossible to determine when one
should and should not trade with another person. Anecdotally,
children trade a number of resources, from baseball cards to
lunchtime snacks to Silly Bands—children seem well acquainted
with trade. Yet it is unclear whether these trades are sim-
ply based on personal preference or on some understanding
of resource value. How do children reconcile others’ personal
preferences with the objective value of resources? Is subjec-
tive or objective value given more weight? Can children cap-
ture gains from trade (Krugman, 1979)? Understanding chil-
dren’s early notions of trade may provide some insight into
how they grow into adults who perform more sophisticated
exchanges.
Despite remaining questions, the current research demon-
strates that children do not treat all inequalities equally—they
use resource value, rather than just resource count, when deciding
how to share with others.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Nina Slywotzky, Anna Merrill, Melanie
Fox, Danielle DeLee, Matt Choy, Zoe Liberman, Suzanne
Horowitz, Alia Martin, Kelcey Wilson, and Alex Chituc for assis-
tance running the participants in these studies. This research was
supported by a grant from the University of Chicago’s ARETE
Initiative/A New Science of Virtue Program.
REFERENCES
Andreoni, J., and Bernheim, D. B.
(2009). Social image and the 50–
50 norm: a theoretical and experi-
mental analysis of audience effects.
Econometrica 77, 1607–1636. doi:
10.3982/ECTA7384
Baumard, N., Mascaro, O., and
Chevallier, C. (2012). Preschoolers
are able to take merit into
account when distributing goods.
Dev. Psychol. 48, 492–498. doi:
10.1037/a0026598
Baumol, W. J. (1972). Economic Theory
and Operations Analysis. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Birch, L., and Billman, J. (1986).
Preschool children’s food sharing
with friends and acquaintances.
Child Dev. 57, 387–395. doi:
10.2307/1130594
Blake, P. R., and McAuliffe, K.
(2011). “I had so much it
didn’t seem fair”: eight-year
olds reject two forms of inequity.
Cognition 120, 215–224. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.006
Blake, P., and Rand, D. (2010).
Currency value moderates equity
preference among young children.
Evol. Hum. Behav. 31, 210–218.
doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.
06.012
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (2005).
The Origin and Evolution of
Cultures. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Brown, T. C. (1984). The concept
of value in resource allocation.
Land Econ. 60, 231–246. doi:
10.2307/3146184
Burgoyne, C. B., and Lea, S. E. G.
(2006). Money is material. Science
314, 1091–1092. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.1135429
Cook, K. S., and Hegtvedt, K. A.
(1983). Distributive justice, equity,
and equality. Ann. Rev. Soc. 9,
217–241. doi: 10.1146/annurev.so.
09.080183.001245
Damon, W. (1977). The Social World
of the Child. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.
Dana, J., Weber, R., and Kuang, J.
(2007). Exploiting moral wiggle
room: experiments demonstrating
an illusory preference for fair-
ness. Econ. Theory 33, 67–80. doi:
10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z
Dawes, C., Fowler, J., Johnson, T.,
McElreath, R., and Smirnov, O.
(2007). Egalitarian motives in
humans. Nature 446, 794–796. doi:
10.1038/nature05651
DeVoe, S. E., and Iyengar, S. S.
(2010). Medium of exchange mat-
ters what’s fair for goods is unfair
for money. Psychol. Sci. 21, 159–162.
doi: 10.1177/0956797609357749
Fagan, B. M. (1969). Early trade in
south central Africa. Archaeology 2,
44–50.
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M.
(1999). A theory of fairness,
competition, and cooperation.
Q. J. Econ. 114, 817–868. doi:
10.1162/003355399556151
Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four ele-
mentary forms of sociality:
framework for a unified theory
of social relations. Psychol. Rev. 99,
689–723. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.
99.4.689
Geraci, A., and Surian, L. (2011). The
developmental roots of fairness:
infants’ reactions to equal and
unequal distributions of resources.
Dev. Sci. 14, 1012–1020. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01048.x
Gurven, M. (2004). To give or to
give not: an evolutionary ecol-
ogy of human food transfers.
Behav. Brain Sci. 27, 543–583. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X04000123
Gurven, M. (2006). The evolution
of contingent cooperation. Curr.
Anthropol. 47, 185–192. doi:
10.1086/499552
Harbaugh, W. T., Krause, K., and
Berry, T. R. (2001). GARP for
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 393 | 8
Shaw and Olson Inequality and value
kids: on the development of
rational choice behavior. Am.
Econ. Rev. 91, 1539–1545. doi:
10.1257/aer.91.5.1539
Hill, K., and Kaplan, H. (1993). On why
male foragers hunt and share food.
Curr. Anthropol. 34, 701–710. doi:
10.1086/204213
Hook, J., and Cook, T. D. (1979).
Equity theory and the cognitive
ability of children. Psychol. Bull. 86,
429–445. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.
86.3.429
Kenward, B., and Dahl, M. (2011).
Preschoolers distribute resources
according to recipients’ moral
status. Dev. Psychol. 47, 1054–1064.
doi: 10.1037/a0023869
Krugman, P. (1979). Increasing
returns, monopolistic compe-
tition, and international trade.
J. Int. Econ. 9, 469–479. doi:
10.1016/0022-1996(79)90017-5
Lerner, M. (1974). The justice motive:
“Equity” and “parity” among chil-
dren. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 29,
539–550. doi: 10.1037/h0036206
Libby, W., and Garrett, J. (1974).
Role of intentionality in mediat-
ing children’s responses to inequity.
Dev. Psychol. 10, 294–297. doi:
10.1037/h0035985
Lynn, M. (1991). Scarcity effect on
value: a quantitative review of
the commodity theory literature.
Psychol. Market. 8, 43–57. doi:
10.1002/mar.4220080105
Olson, K. R., and Spelke, E. S.
(2008). Foundations of coop-
eration in young children.
Cognition 108, 222–231. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.003
Mills, J., and Clark, M. S. (1994).
“Communal and exchange rela-
tionships: controversies and
research,” in Theoretical frame-
works for personal relationships,
eds R. Erber and R. Gilmour
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
29–42.
Moore, C. (2009). Fairness in
children’s resource allocation
depends on the recipient. Psychol.
Sci. 8, 944–948. doi: 10.1111/
j.1467-9280.2009.02378.x
Novakova, J., and Flegr, J. (2013). How
much is our fairness worth? The
effect of raising stakes on offers by
proposers and minimum acceptable
offers in dictator and ultimatum
games. PLoS ONE 8:e60966. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0060966
Schmidt, M. F., and Sommerville, J.
A. (2011). Fairness expections and
altruistic sharing in 15-month-old
human infants. PLoS ONE 6:e23223.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0023223
Shaw, A., DeScioli, P., and Olson,
K. R. (2012). Fairness versus
favoritism in children. Evol. Hum.
Behav. 33, 736–745. doi: 10.1016/
j.evolhumbehav.2012.06.001
Shaw, A., and Knobe, J. (2013).
Not all mutualism is fair, and
not all fairness is mutualistic.
Behav. Brain Sci. 36, 100–101. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X12000878
Shaw, A., Montinari, N., Piovesan, M.,
Olson, K. R., Gino, F., and Norton,
M. I. (in press). Children develop
a veil of fairness. J. Exp. Psychol.
Gen. doi: 10.1037/a0031247. [Epub
ahead of print].
Shaw, A., and Olson, K. R. (2012).
Children discard a resource to avoid
inequity. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 141,
382–395. doi: 10.1037/a0025907
Sigelman, C. K., and Waitzman, K.
A. (1991). The development of
distributive justice orientations:
contextual influences on children’s
resource allocations. Child Dev. 62,
1367–1378. doi: 10.2307/1130812
Sloane, S., Baillargeon, R., and
Premack, D. (2012). Do infants
have a sense of fairness? Psychol.
Sci. 23, 196–204. doi: 10.1177/
0956797611422072
Sommerville, J. A., Schmidt, M.
F., Yun, J. E., and Burns, M.
(2012). The development of
fairness expectations and proso-
cial behavior in the second year
of life. Infancy 18, 40–66. doi:
10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00129.x
Walster, E., Walster, G. W., and
Berscheid, E. (1978). Equity Theory
and Research. Boston: Allyn &
Bacon.
Xiao, E., and Bicchieri, C. (2010).
When equality trumps reciprocity.
J. Econ. Psychol. 31, 456–470.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 01 March 2013; accepted: 11
June 2013; published online: 19 July
2013.
Citation: Shaw A and Olson KR (2013)
All inequality is not equal: children cor-
rect inequalities using resource value.
Front. Psychol. 4:393. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2013.00393
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Emotion Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Shaw and Olson.
This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which
permits use, distribution and reproduc-
tion in other forums, provided the origi-
nal authors and source are credited and
subject to any copyright notices concern-
ing any third-party graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 393 | 9
